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Bankruptcy in the Courts: Continuity in an Era of Change? 
 
Introduction 
The assertion that insolvency practitioners have had to face up to a maelstrom of legislative 
change in the past 18 months is no great revelation.  Reforms brought about by the Small 
Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 and the Deregulation Act 2015, coupled with 
the belated introduction of s. 71 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 20131, would, 
at any time, have been difficult to assimilate.  But, of course, matters have been 
exacerbated by the complete transition of the operational secondary rules to the Insolvency 
(England and Wales) Rules 2016 (SI 2016/1024) (hereafter “IR 2016”).  The coming on 
stream of the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation (2015/848) has spawned further 
amendments to the 1986 Act and the IR 2016 – see the Insolvency Amendment (EU 
2015/848) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/702)2.  In this climate of legislative turmoil it is easy to 
lose sight of what the courts are saying about the law of bankruptcy.  There is a great 
degree of continuity in this jurisprudence, which is reassuring in such troubled times. 
 
Relevance of bankruptcy 
The diminution in status of bankruptcy as a feature of the topography in personal insolvency 
law in England and Wales is now clear.  It trails well beyond IVAs in terms of statistical 
significance and is now less prominent than the DRO procedure introduced in 20093.  The 
raising of the minimum debt to £5000 for creditor petitions4 and the introduction of the out 
of court adjudication procedure for debtors wishing to bankrupt themselves has had some 
impact upon the cases coming before the courts5.  But in spite of this, cases of interest do 
arise and they have to be resolved by the judiciary. 
The English bankruptcy regime is still comparatively generous to the debtor.  Bankruptcy 
tourism from other EU Member States will not disappear overnight in spite of the 
liberalisation of the bankruptcy laws of certain Member States.  It is unclear how the advent 
of the new adjudication procedure will impact on the position, but the ruling of Chief 
                                                          
1   Which introduced the new out of court “adjudication” procedure replacing debtor 
petitions to the court in bankruptcy from 6 April 2016. 
2   Readers should note also the EURIP Implementing Regulation (2017/1105) which provides 
some standard forms necessary for the operation of the new regime. 
3   Via the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, Part 5. 
4   See Insolvency Act 1986 (Amendment) Order 2015 (SI 2015/922). 
5   But ironically it appears to have reversed the apparently inexorable decline of bankruptcy 
usage. 
Registrar Baister in Re Budniok 6 might suggest that established principles governing 
determination of the debtor’s centre of main interests (COMI) will continue to apply.  It is 
far too early to determine how the new rules on determining COMI for individual debtors 
found in Art 3(1) of the Recast EU Insolvency Regulation (2015/848)7 might affect the 
phenomenon of bankruptcy tourism in the English courts, but, in view of Brexit, any such 
change might be only of short term relevance. 
 
Initiating bankruptcy 
As has been the position for many years the procedure in a creditor-induced bankruptcy 
starts with a statutory demand.  The demand must be for an enforceable bankruptcy debt in 
excess of £5000.  This is clear from ss. 267 and 268 of the Insolvency Act 1986. In Blavo v 
The Law Society 8 the court held that unspecified intervention costs incurred in respect of 
regulatory action with regard to intervention in a legal practice could not be treated as a 
liquidated sum and therefore the statutory demand should be set aside.  In so deciding HHJ 
Klein refused to follow Pyke v Law Society9. 
A common response to the statutory demand will be a set aside application.  The grounds 
for set aside are now mapped out in IR 2016 r. 10.5(5).  These replicate the position under 
rule 6.5(4) of the Insolvency Rules 1986. What is clear is that the court will be reluctant to 
entertain arguments that have already been run on a previous unsuccessful set aside 
application – see the comments of Henderson LJ in the Court of Appeal in Harvey v Dunbar 
Assets 10. 
If there is no set aside of the statutory demand, the creditor can proceed to present a 
bankruptcy petition.  The rules on service11 must be satisfied, but the courts take a 
pragmatic approach.  It was reiterated by HHJ Karen Walden Smith in Emmanuel v HMRC 12 
that the basic test is whether the creditor has done all that was reasonable to serve the 
statutory demand and petition on the debtor so as to bring these matters to his attention.   
However, if the rules on service have not been satisfied a bankruptcy petition cannot be 
allowed to proceed, a point confirmed by Jeremy Cousins QC sitting in the High Court in 
Canning v Irwin Mitchell 13. 
Once the court hears the petition it has a range of options open to it.  It can dismiss the 
petition if the creditor has unreasonably refused an offer from the debtor to settle or 
                                                          
6   [2017] EWHC 368 (Ch).  For comment see Watson [2017] 30 Insolv Intell (forthcoming). 
7   For discussion of this measure see Fletcher [2015] 28 Insolv Intell 97. 
8   [2017] EWHC 561 (Ch). 
9   [2006] EWHC 3489 (Ch), an ex tempore decision of Blackburne J. 
10   [2017] EWCA Civ 60. 
11   See in particular IR 2016 rr. 10.2, 10.3 (statutory demand) and 10.14 (petition). 
12   [2017] EWHC 1253 (Ch). 
13   [2017] EWHC 718 (Ch). 
compound or to provide security (see s. 271(3)).  This it will rarely do, taking the view that 
the creditor should be given a degree of latitude as to its response to the debtor’s offer. 
The debtor will often try to forestall the court from making a bankruptcy order by arguing 
that the underlying debt is subject to some sort of appeal.  The court is unlikely to be 
swayed by the existence of such an appeal because it takes the view that debts, especially 
those underpinned by court judgments, stand until reversed, but it will sometimes remind 
the creditor of the dangers to it in terms of potential adverse costs of proceeding to seek 
bankruptcy in such circumstances.  
In Choudhry v Luton BC14   Newey J held that as the debtor had had the opportunity to 
challenge the statutory demand on the grounds now raised before the court hearing the 
petition, but had not taken the opportunity to do so, the court was entitled to make an 
immediate bankruptcy order and did not have to delay until a challenge to the underlying 
debt was made. 
 
Appeals, annulments and reviews 
This appears to be a more common phenomenon these days and is often fuelled by the 
failure of the debtor to engage with the bankruptcy process until too late in the day.  From 
the debtor’s perspective, this is a dangerous game to play. 
If the court makes a bankruptcy order, it can be appealed.  A question that often arises is 
whether the bankruptcy order can be stayed/adjourned pending the outcome of an appeal.  
Judicial attitudes vary here.   
A bankruptcy order made on the back of a tainted debt or judgment is not void.  It remains 
valid until annulled15.  The court can annul under s. 282 of the Insolvency Act 1986 on the 
grounds that the bankruptcy order should not have been made in the first place or that the 
bankruptcy debts (and expenses) have been paid.  On an annulment application the court 
can consider fresh evidence put before it16.  If the application is for an annulment pursuant 
to s. 282 of the 1986 Act the bankruptcy will usually have been ongoing for some time.  This 
means that a trustee in bankruptcy will have been appointed and a claim for remuneration 
and expenses will have accrued.  No matter if the annulment is eventually granted, the court 
will protect this professional expectation of reimbursement.  The Court of Appeal confirmed 
this in Oraki17  
                                                          
14  [2017] EWHC 960 (Ch). 
15   Oraki v Dean and Dean [2017] EWHC 11 (Ch) (Robert Ham QC).  
16   Indeed failure to consider fresh evidence submitted by the bankrupt could invalidate any 
decision made on the bankruptcy annulment application –  see the comments of Morgan J 
in Richards v Vivendi SA [2017] EWHC 1581 (Ch). 
17   [2017] EWCA Civ 403. 
There is also the possibility of seeking a review of the bankruptcy order pursuant to s. 375 of 
the Insolvency Act 1986, but the courts will require exceptional circumstances to be present 
before going down this particular road.   
 
The estate 
The policy of the courts over decades has been to try to maximise the scope of the 
bankruptcy estate so as to enhance recovery prospects for creditors.  That policy has been 
counteracted to some extent by judicial intervention, for example by the introduction of the 
“use it or lose it” rule for private dwellings now found in s. 283A of the Act.  Trust assets are 
also excluded18. Pension entitlements can also fall outside the estate, but may be subject to 
clawback applications pursuant to ss. 342A-342C19.   
The “tools of the trade” exemption in s. 283(2)(a) is well established and serves an 
important purpose in protecting the bankrupt’s ability to earn a living in the future.  But its 
limitations were exposed in Mikki v Duncan 20 where the Court of Appeal doubted whether 
an intangible chose in action, such as the benefit of a contract, could be within the tools of 
the trade category.  This cautious approach is sensible – any extension of the exemptions 
from the bankruptcy estate is a policy decision for the legislature. 
 
Stewardship of trustee 
The fact that a trustee in bankruptcy owes duties of care is well established and entirely 
appropriate. 
Section 304 of the Insolvency Act 1986 is a key provision here as it deals with the 
parameters of liability and the procedures for initiating a claim under the provision.  Leave is 
required if the trustee has been released under s. 299. There is some judicial disagreement 
as to its scope.  In Oraki at first instance21 Proudman J appeared to express the view that 
s.304 was the sole source of a trustee’s duties and no common law elements of liability in 
negligence subsisted outwith (see para [34]).  She further appeared to indicate at para [162] 
that a s. 299 release of the trustee would eliminate the possibility of any claim against the 
trustee save explicitly under s. 304.  On appeal, in obiter dicta David Richards LJ disagreed 
on the point of the exclusive nature of s. 30422 .  David Richards LJ clearly had doubts about 
the s. 299 observation of Proudman J and refused to endorse it23, but did not put forward a 
                                                          
18   On the trust exception s. 283(3) note Abdulla v Whelan [2017] EWHC 605 (Ch). 
19   The prospects of obtaining an income payments order under s. 310 of the Act against an 
uncrystallised pension entitlement have been considerably reduced by Horton v Henry 
[2016] EWCA Civ 989. 
20   [2017] BPIR 490. 
21   [2015] EWHC 2046 (Ch). 
22   [2017] EWCA Civ 403 at para [217]. 
23   [2017] EWCA Civ 403 at para [221]. 
conclusive view of his own on this specific matter as it was not necessary to determine the 
appeal.  Future clarification on the interaction between these statutory provisions is 
therefore required. 
Effective discharge of stewardship in bankruptcy must involve the full range and proper use 
of the trustee’s powers.  One such power is that of disclaimer of onerous assets pursuant to 
s. 315 of the 1986 Act.  The potential scope of this extraordinary statutory power was 
considered by the court in Abdulla v Whelan 24.  John Male QC (sitting in the High Court) 
held that the power of disclaimer could only be exercised against property that was actually 
vested in the estate rather than all property that might be under the control of the 
bankrupt.  Therefore property vested in the bankrupt in his capacity as trustee could not be 
disclaimed as trust property fell outwith the estate.  Such property remained with the 
bankrupt/trustee and legal consequences would inevitably flow from that outcome. 
 
Discharge 
The most contentious issue relating to discharge concerns the use of suspended discharge 
to encourage cooperation on the part of the bankrupt.  The court has the power to suspend 
the 12 month automatic discharge if invited to do so under s. 279(3) of the 1986 Act.  With 
the truncating of the bankruptcy period to a period of one year, suspension of automatic 
discharge becomes more likely particularly where securing cooperation from a bankrupt 
might prove difficult.  A couple of recent cases exemplify judicial attitudes in regard to 
suspension applications. 
In Harris v Official Receiver 25 Andrew Simmonds QC (sitting in the High Court) made the 
point that there may be more than one consecutive application to suspend discharge.  Here 
a fixed period of suspension had not produced the required cooperation from the bankrupt 
so the court acceded to a further suspension application. 
In Weir v Hilsdon 26 the bankrupt had not been forthcoming on matters relating to his 
income.  Accordingly, the trustee sought to persuade the court to suspend discharge.  The 
bankrupt objected, claiming that the suspension was merely designed to facilitate an 
application to the court for an income payments order (which could only be made during 
the period prior to discharge).  Nugee J did not see any difficulty with this strategy; though 
he did indicate that it would not take the same view in cases where the trustee had simply 
been tardy in seeking an income payments order and was using suspension to make good 
on his own failings.  That said, the court in Weir (supra) made an important procedural 
observation.  It rejected the unspecific form of the order for indefinite suspension as 
                                                          
24   [2017] EWHC 605 (Ch). 
25   [2016 EWHC 3433 (Ch), [2017] BPIR 444. 
26   [2017] EWHC 983 (Ch).  For analysis see Patterson [2017] 30 Insolv Intell 85. 
adopted in Mawer v Bland27.  Bankruptcy courts should take this point on board when 







                                                          
27   [2013] EWHC 3122 (Ch).  In so doing the court in Weir approved the criticisms of the 
Mawer type suspension order made by Patterson in [2016] 29 Insolv Intell 21. 
